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Abstract
We investigate a multi-factor extension of the asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model
that underlies the capital charges of the “Basel II Accord”. In this extended model, it is
still possible to derive closed-form solutions for the risk contributions to Value-at-Risk and
Expected Shortfall. As an application of the risk contribution formulae we introduce a
new concept for a diversification measure. The use of this new measure is illustrated by
an example calculated with a two-factor model. The results with this model indicate that,
thanks to dependence on not fully correlated systematic sectors, there can be a substantial
reduction of risk contributions by sectoral diversification effects.
1 Introduction
The Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRBA) of Basel II (BCBS, 2006) is often regarded as
a first step towards supervisory recognition of portfolio credit risk models for calculation of
minimum capital requirements. IRBA capital formulae were derived within a special portfolio
credit model, the so-called “Asymptotic Single Risk Factor Model” (ASRF model, Gordy, 2003).
This model has the property that capital allocations to individual positions depend only upon the
characteristics of these positions, but not upon the composition of the portfolio. This property
of “portfolio invariance” allows for computational simplicity, in particular in that the required
capital for a credit risk portfolio can be calculated in a bottom-up approach by determining
capital requirements at the position level and adding them up. As a consequence, however, the
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model can reflect neither name concentrations nor the sectoral structure of the portfolio (i.e.,
the distribution of borrowers across industry and geographic regions).
The model’s inability to capture name concentrations entails a potential underestimation of the
risk inherent in the portfolio, whereas its fault in recognizing the potential diversification effects
following from the sectoral structure of the portfolio could result in an overestimation of portfolio
risk. Overestimation of portfolio risk, however, can only occur if there is no significant change
in the assigned asset correlations between the one-factor model and the multi-factor model
that reflects the sectoral structure. In comparison with a multi-factor model where there are
significantly higher average asset correlations, the ASRF model even can underestimate portfolio
risk. As a consequence, whether the ASRF model underestimates the risk of a certain portfolio
or not has to be examined on a case by case basis. The Basel Committee decided to deal in
Pillar 2 of the Basel II Accord (BCBS, 2006) with the assessment of name risk concentration.
As a consequence there is so far no automatism of extended regulatory capital requirements
for risk concentrations, but banks will have to demonstrate to the supervisors that they have
established appropriate procedures to keep concentrations under control. A quantitative way of
tackling the name concentration issue was suggested in Emmer and Tasche (2005), for instance.
In the present paper, we suggest a minimal – in the spirit of Emmer and Tasche (2005) –
extension of the Basel II model that allows to study the effects of the sectoral structure on
portfolio risk. Admitting several risk factors instead of a single factor only and applying the
same transition to the limit as described in Gordy (2003), we arrive at versions of the model that
remove the restriction of assuming a one-sector structure. Alternatively, our class of models can
be regarded as special cases of the asymptotic models introduced by Lucas et al. (2001, Theorem
1).
As determining risk contributions or, economically speaking, capital requirements for assets, sec-
tors or sub-portfolios, is a main purpose when using credit risk models, deriving exact formulae
for risk contributions to “Value-at-risk” (VaR) and “Expected Shortfall” (ES) in the asymptotic
multi-risk factors setting represents an important contribution of our paper to the subject. Our
results complement results on the differentiation of VaR and ES presented in Gourie´roux et al.
(2000), Lemus (1999), and Tasche (1999). In contrast to those papers, the results given below
can be applied for calculating economic capital or contributions to economic capital without any
further adaptation of the formulae. From a computational point of view, the resulting formulae
are more demanding than in the one factor case, and – necessarily, as otherwise diversification
effects could not be recognized – the resulting risk contributions are not portfolio invariant any
longer.
As an application of the risk contribution formulae we introduce then a new concept for a
measure of diversification, called diversification factor. This factor can be computed at portfolio
as well as at sub-portfolio, sector or asset level, thus allowing the main concentrations to be
identified. The use of these new factors is illustrated by an example calculated with a two-factor
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model. The results with this model indicate that there can be a substantial reduction of risk
contributions by sectoral diversification effects.
The material presented here is closely related to work by Pykhtin (2004) and Garcia Cespedes et al.
(2006). Pykhtin describes an approximation of multi-factor models by single-factor models,
thus transferring the computational simplicity of single-factor models to multi-factor mod-
els. Garcia Cespedes et al. propose “factor adjustments” to stand-alone capital charges in
order to reflect diversification effects. As our results on the risk contribution formulae are
not approximate but exact they could be used for benchmarking the results by Pykhtin and
Garcia Cespedes et al.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the class of models we are going
to analyze and derive some basic properties. In Section 3 we briefly review the Euler alloca-
tion principle that justifies the use of partial derivatives as risk contributions and derive then
the formulae for risk contributions to VaR and ES in the asymptotic multi-factor setting. A
potential application of the risk contribution formulae for the purpose of identifying sources of
risk concentration is suggested in Section 4 where a new concept for a diversification measure
is introduced. Section 5 gives a numerical illustration of a potential application of the formulae
and the diversification factor. We conclude with some summarizing comments in Section 6.
2 Asymptotic multi-factor models: basic properties
The starting point for the factor models1 we are going to consider is a random variable L˜(u) =
L˜(u1, . . . , un) that reflects the loss suffered from a portfolio of n credit assets, with respective
exposures ui. The tilde indicates that we regard the original loss variable, without any approxi-
mation procedure. The variable L˜(u) can be interpreted as the absolute loss, measured in units
of some currency. Then the ui are absolute exposures
2 and amounts of money. Alternatively,
L˜(u) can also be understood as relative loss, indicating the lost percentage of the sum of all
exposures3. In this case the ui are non-negative numbers without units that add up to 1.
Formally, the original loss variable L˜(u) is given as
L˜(u) =
n∑
i=1
ui 1Di . (2.1)
The term 1Di is the default indicator variable for asset i, i.e. it takes the value of 1 if i defaults
and 0 if not. As a consequence, the sum in (2.1) will be built up with only those ui’s that relate
1See Bluhm et al. (2002) and the references therein for more information on credit risk models.
2
ui may also be thought as a face value multiplied with some factor that expresses the average loss rate in
case of default.
3If the underlying absolute loss variable incorporates average loss rates in case of default, relative loss rather
indicates the lost percentage of the sum of all exposures, weighted with their average loss rates.
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to defaulted assets i. For factor models, it is quite common to specify the default events Di by
Di =
{∑k
j=1
̺i,j Sj + ωi ξi ≤ ti
}
, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.2)
where the following holds for the involved constants and random variables:
• The random variables S1, . . . , Sk are the systematic risk factors. They are assumed to
capture the dependence of the default events. In general, we have k ≪ n. Within this
paper, we assume that the factor variables are standardized, i.e.
E[Sj] = 0 and var[Sj ] = 1, j = 1, . . . , k. (2.3)
The S1, . . . , Sk may be stochastically dependent, but they do not have do be.
• The random variables ξ1, . . . , ξn are the idiosyncratic risk drivers. They are also standard-
ized, i.e.
E[ξi] = 0 and var[ξi] = 1, i = 1, . . . , n. (2.4)
ξ1, . . . , ξn, (S1, . . . , Sk) are stochastically independent. As a consequence, conditional on
(S1, . . . , Sk), the default events Di, i = 1, . . . , n are independent.
• The constants ̺i,j, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , k are the factor loadings of the systematic
factors. We assume that
k∑
j=1,ℓ=1
̺i,j ̺i,ℓ corr[Sj , Sℓ] ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , n. (2.5)
By (2.5) and the standardization assumption on the Sj and ξi the idiosyncratic loadings
ωi, i = . . . , n are well defined by
ωi =
√√√√1− k∑
j=1,ℓ=1
̺i,j ̺i,ℓ corr[Sj , Sℓ]. (2.6)
As a further consequence of (2.5) and (2.6) and of the standardization assumptions also
the asset values changes
∑k
j=1 ̺i,j Sj + ωi ξi are standardized.
• The constant ti, i = 1, . . . , n is called default threshold. It can be thought as a critical loss
in value of borrower i’s assets that causes the borrower to default on asset i. It is common
to derive ti from borrower i’s (assumed to be known) probability of default pi. Hence, we
determine ti such that
P[Di] = P
[∑k
j=1
̺i,j Sj + ωi ξi ≤ ti
]
= pi, i = 1, . . . n. (2.7)
When the idiosyncratic risk drivers ξi and the factor variables are all standard normally
distributed, also the asset value changes
∑k
j=1 ̺i,j Sj + ωi ξi are standard normal. Let Φ
denote the standard normal distribution function. By (2.7) we then have pi = Φ(ti).
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Assuming conditional independence of the default events, given the realizations of the system-
atic factors, entails by the law of large numbers that the loss variable L˜(u) can be reasonably
approximated by a modified loss variable Lˆ(u). The approximate loss variable Lˆ(u) then de-
pends on the systematic factors only (cf. Gordy, 2003; Lucas et al., 2001). This is interpreted
as elimination of the idiosyncratic risk by name diversification. In general, the quality of the
approximation depends on conditions like the number of credit assets in the portfolio, the gran-
ularity of the portfolio, or the correlations of the asset value changes with the systematic factors.
Lˆ(u) is obtained from L˜(u) by replacing the default indicators 1Di with their best predictors
given the systematic factors, i.e. with the conditional probabilities P[Di | (S1, . . . , Sk)]. Hence
Lˆ(u) is given by
Lˆ(u) =
n∑
i=1
ui P[Di | (S1, . . . , Sk)]. (2.8)
Example 2.1 If the default events are given by (2.2) and the idiosyncratic risk drivers ξi are
standard normally distributed, then the approximate loss variable Lˆ(u) can be written as
Lˆ(u) =
n∑
i=1
ui Φ
(
ti −
∑k
j=1 ̺i,j Sj
ωi
)
. (2.9)
Example 2.1 suggests to consider a – compared to (2.8) – slightly generalized loss variable L(u)
L(u) =
n∑
i=1
ui gi(S) =
n∑
i=1
ui gi(S1, . . . , Sk), (2.10)
with gi : R
k → [0, 1], i = 1, . . . , n decreasing4 at least in one (always the same) component of
the vector argument. Considering the loss variable in this generalized form might be of interest,
in particular, when losses are measured mark-to-market.
When investigating the generalized loss variable L(u) we will need some technical conditions
and notations as specified in the following assumption and (2.12a), (2.12b) and (2.12c).
Assumption 2.2
1. The exposures ui, i = 1, . . . , n in definition (2.10) are non-negative.
2. For any fixed (k − 1)-tuple (s2, . . . , sk) the mapping
s1 7→
n∑
i=1
ui gi(s1, . . . , sk), R→ [0,∞[ (2.11)
is strictly decreasing, continuous, and onto ]0, U [, with U defined by U =∑ni=1 ui.
4The results of this paper hold also when “decreasing” is replaced by “increasing”. Some of the formulae then
must be appropriately adapted.
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3. There is a conditional density h(s1 | s2, . . . , sk) of S1 given (S2, . . . , Sk).
The condition that the mapping from (2.11) is onto ]0, U [ is, in particular, satisfied when L(u)
is specified as in Example 2.1 with ̺i,1 > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. The condition, however, could
be dispensed with, at the price of having more complexity in the following results on densities
and risk contributions. For the sake of a more concise notation we define
S˜ = (S2, . . . , Sk), s˜ = (s2, . . . , sk). (2.12a)
The distribution PS˜−1 of S˜ is then given by the relation
PS˜−1(A) = P[S˜ ∈ A] (2.12b)
that holds for all Borel-sets A ⊂ Rk−1. In particular, if S˜ has a density φ, then integration with
respect to the distribution of S˜ can be expressed as PS˜−1(ds˜) = φ(s˜) ds˜. For fixed u write
G(v, s˜) =
n∑
j=1
uj gj(v, s˜). (2.12c)
By Assumption 2.2, then, for fixed s˜, v 7→ G(v, s˜) is invertible. Write G(·, s˜)−1 for the inverse
function of v 7→ G(v, s˜). Write additionally G(·, s˜)−1(0) =∞ and G(·, s˜)−1(z) = −∞ for z ≥ U .
Having fixed the assumptions and notations, we can prove a result on the calculation of moments
that in particular implies that the distribution of the generalized loss variable L(u) has a density.
Moreover, Proposition 2.3 will be applied, in the context of model (2.10), for identifying the VaR
contributions as conditional expectations.
Proposition 2.3 Let F : [0, 1]→ R be arbitrary and L(u) be the loss variable defined by (2.10).
Then, under Assumption5 2.2, for any 0 ≤ z ≤ U and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have:
E
[
F (gi(S))1{L(u)≤z}
]
= −
∫ z
0
E
[
F
(
gi(G(·, S˜)−1(t), S˜)
)
h
(
G(·, S˜)−1(t) | S˜)
∂
∂v
G(v, S˜)
∣∣
v=G(·,S˜)−1(t)
]
dt.
Proof.
E
[
F (gi(S))1{L(u)≤z}
]
=
∫
E
[
F (gi(S1, S˜))1{G(S1 ,S˜)≤z} | S˜ = s˜
]
PS˜−1(ds˜) (2.13a)
(taking into account G(·, s˜)−1(0) =∞)
=
∫ ∫ ∞
G(·,s˜)−1(z)
F
(
gi(y, s˜)
)
h(y | s˜) dyPS˜−1(ds˜) (2.13b)
5In order to keep the representation of the results as intuitive and clear as possible here and in the following the
proofs will not be rigorous but rather consist of calculations without consideration of continuity, differentiability
etc. Moreover, for some of the results, additional assumptions on existence of moments etc. must be made.
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(substituting y = G(·, s˜)−1(t))
= −
∫ ∫ z
0
F
(
gi(G(·, s˜)−1(t), s˜)
)
h
(
G(·, s˜)−1(t) | s˜)
∂
∂v
G(v, S˜)
∣∣
v=G(·,S˜)−1(t)
dtPS˜−1(ds˜).
The assertion follows by applying Fubini’s theorem. ✷
The choice F = 1 in Proposition 2.3 implies the existence of a density for the distribution of the
generalized loss variable:
Corollary 2.4 Under Assumption 2.2, the loss variable L(u) from (2.10) has the density fL(u) :
]0,U [→ [0,∞[, defined by
fL(u)(t) = −E
 h(G(·, S˜)−1(t) | S˜)
∂
∂v
G(v, S˜)
∣∣
v=G(·,S˜)−1(t)
 , t ∈ ]0, U [. (2.14)
Note that Gordy’s (2003) ASRF (Asymptotic Single Risk Factor) model is a special case of (2.8)
with k = 1. Then the expectation in (2.14) disappears, and the density h and the inverse of G
do not depend on s˜. Nevertheless, in the case of non-constant asset correlations or probabilities
of default the calculation of the density of L(u) will involve numerical inversion of G even in the
simple ASRF case.
In case that a closed-form representation of the conditional distribution of S1 given S˜ is known
(e.g. if S is jointly normally distributed), Equation (2.13a) (with F = 1) immediately yields a
more efficient way to calculate the distribution function of L(u) than Corollary 2.4 does. The
reason is that application of Corollary 2.4 would require evaluation of a k-dimensional integral
if S had a density, whereas the application of the following Proposition 2.5 would only require
evaluation of a (k − 1)-dimensional integral.
Proposition 2.5 Under Assumption 2.2, the distribution function of the loss variable L(u) as
given in (2.10) can be calculated by means of
P[L(u) ≤ z] =
∫
P
[
S1 ≥ G(·, S˜)−1(z) | S˜ = s˜
]
PS˜−1(ds˜). (2.15)
Define, for α ∈ (0, 1) and any real random variable X, the α-quantile of X by
qα(X) = min{x : P[X ≤ x] ≥ α}. (2.16)
Quantiles at high levels (e.g. 99.9%) are popular metrics for determining the economic capital
of portfolios. Within the financial community, the α-quantile of a loss distribution is commonly
called Value-at-Risk (VaR) at level α. In case of the generalized loss variable L(u) the quantiles
qα(L(u)) can be computed by numerical inversion of (2.15).
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We conclude this section by providing two alternative formulae for the calculation of another
popular risk measure, the Expected Shortfall6, in the case of the asymptotic multi-factor model
under consideration.
Remark 2.6 The Expected Shortfall ESα(L(u)) = E[L(u) |L(u) ≥ qα(L(u))] at level α of the
loss variable L(u) from (2.10) can alternatively be calculated with recourse to Corollary 2.4 or
to Proposition 2.5. Note that the existence of a density of the distribution of L(u) (Corollary
2.4) implies P[L(u) ≥ qα(L(u))] = 1− α. From Corollary 2.4 we can therefore derive
E[L(u) |L(u) ≥ qα(L(u))] = −(1− α)−1
∫ U
qα(L(u))
tE
 h(G(·, S˜)−1(t) | S˜)
∂
∂v
G(v, S˜)
∣∣
v=G(·,S˜)−1(t)
 dt. (2.17a)
From Proposition 2.5 we obtain (by making use of the formula E[X] =
∫∞
0 P[X ≥ x] dx for
X ≥ 0)
E[L(u) |L(u) ≥ qα(L(u))] (2.17b)
= qα(L(u)) + (1− α)−1
U∫
qα(L(u))
∫
P
[
S1 ≤ G(·, S˜)−1(z) | S˜ = s˜
]
PS˜−1(ds˜) dz.
3 Computing the risk contributions
When economic capital for a portfolio is determined by means of a homogeneous risk measure,
according to the Euler allocation principle – to be introduced in Section 3.1 – the risk contribu-
tions of assets should be calculated as partial derivatives of the portfolio-wide economic capital
with respect to the exposures. In Section 3.2 we will then derive formulae for the derivatives
of Value-at-Risk7 as defined by (2.16) and Expected Shortfall as defined in Remark 2.6 in the
context of the asymptotic multi-factor model of Section 2.
3.1 Euler allocation
Suppose that real-valued random variables X1, . . . ,Xn are given that stand for the profits and
losses with the assets in a portfolio. Let Y denote the portfolio-wide profit and loss, i.e. let
Y =
n∑
i=1
Xi. (3.1)
6See Acerbi and Tasche (2002) and the references given therein for more details on Expected Shortfall vs.
Value-at-Risk. In particular, in case of discontinuous loss distributions the definition of ES has to be slightly
modified in order to make it a risk measure superior to VaR.
7See Mausser and Rosen (2004) and the references therein for the practical issues when estimating VaR con-
tributions from statistical samples.
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The economic capital EC required by the portfolio is determined with a risk measure ρ, i.e.
EC = ρ(Y ). (3.2)
Definition 3.1 If ρ is a risk measure and V,W are random variables such that the derivative
d
dh
ρ(hV +W )
∣∣
h=0
exists, then
ρ(V |W ) = d
dh
ρ(hV +W )
∣∣
h=0
is called contribution of V to the risk of W in respect of ρ.
It is natural to require that, in a portfolio with loss variable as in (3.1), the risk contributions add
up to the portfolio EC. As we will see below, this property is closely related to a homogeneity
property of the risk measure ρ.
Assumption 3.2 The risk measure ρ is positively homogeneous, i.e.
ρ(hZ) = hρ(Z)
for any random variable Z in the definition set of ρ and h > 0.
This assumption seems very natural as long as the asset or portfolio under consideration is not
significant compared to the market as a whole and is not subject to market liquidity risk.
If for every i the contribution of Xi to the risk of Y exists, then we have by Euler’s theorem on
the representation of positively homogenous functions
ρ(Y ) =
n∑
i=1
ρ(Xi |Y ). (3.3)
Hence, as required, positive homogeneity implies that, within a portfolio, the risk contributions
add up to the total risk. This additivity property is of high practical importance.
The decomposition of the portfolio risk ρ as given by (3.3) is called Euler allocation. The use of
the Euler allocation principle was justified by several authors with different reasonings:
• Patrik et al. (1999) argued from a practitioner’s view emphasizing mainly the fact that
the risk contributions according to the Euler principle by (3.3) naturally add up to the
portfolio-wide economic capital.
• Litterman (1996) and Tasche (1999) pointed out that the Euler principle is fully compatible
with economically sensible portfolio diagnostics and optimization.
• Denault (2001) derived the Euler principle by game-theoretic considerations.
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• In the context of capital allocation for insurance companies, Myers and Read (2001) argued
that applying the Euler principle to the expected “default value” (essentially E[max(Y, 0)])
of the insurance portfolio is most appropriate for deriving line-by-line surplus requirements.
• More recently Kalkbrener (2005) presented an axiomatic approach to capital allocation and
risk contributions. One of his axioms requires that risk contributions do not exceed the
corresponding stand-alone risks. From this axiom in connection with more technical condi-
tions, in the context of sub-additive and positively homogeneous risk measures, Kalkbrener
concluded that the Euler principle is the only allocation principle to be compatible with
the “diversification”-axiom (see also Kalkbrener et al., 2004; Tasche, 2002).
3.2 Partial derivatives of VaR and ES
Before coming to the main result on the partial derivatives of VaR with respect to the exposures
of the assets in the portfolio, we will shortly discuss the case of Gordy’s (2003) ASRF model.
Example 3.3 In Gordy’s (2003, cf. Proposition 4) ASRF model Equation (2.10) reads
L(u) =
n∑
j=1
uj gj(S), (3.4)
where S, the single systematic factor, stands for a random variable that satisfies some additional
conditions. The gj are strictly increasing and continuous functions. As a consequence, the terms
gj(S) in (3.4) are comonotonic (see Section 4 for a definition) random variables. From the
comonotonic additivity of VaR and ES (see, e.g., Tasche, 2002) follows then for any α ∈ (0, 1)
that
qα(L(u)) =
n∑
j=1
uj qα(gj(S)) (3.5a)
and
E[L(u) |L(u) ≥ qα(L(u))] =
n∑
j=1
uj E[gj(S) | gj(X) ≥ qα(gj(S))]. (3.5b)
As the right-hand sides of (3.5a) and (3.5b) are linear in the exposure vector u, applying the
Euler allocation principle with partial derivatives with respect to the components of u yields
that the risk contributions to VaR or ES in the ASRF model model equal the corresponding
stand-alone risks.
In the following, we compute the derivatives of VaR and ES in the context of an asymptotic
multi-factor model as given by (2.10). The validity of the results is subject to technical conditions
10
similar to those of Tasche (1999, Section 5). For reasons of readability of the text we do not
discuss these conditions here in detail.
Write (slightly modifying the notation from (2.12c) but keeping (2.12a))
G(v, s˜, u) =
n∑
j=1
uj gj(v, s˜) (3.6a)
as well as
G−1(s˜,u)(z) = G(·, s˜, u)−1(z). (3.6b)
Hence G−1(s˜,u)(z) denotes the solution v
∗ of the equation
G(v∗, s˜, u) = z (3.6c)
with fixed s˜ and u. Note that existence and uniqueness of G−1(s˜,u)(z) is guaranteed by Assumption
2.2. Thus prepared, we can state the main result of this paper (Theorem 3.4), namely that in the
asymptotic multi-factor model the risk contributions to VaR, calculated as partial derivatives,
coincide with certain expectations conditional on the portfolio loss equalling VaR.
Theorem 3.4 Under Assumption 2.28, the quantiles (VaRs) qα(u) = qα(L(u)) at level α ∈
(0, 1) of the generalized loss variable L(u) as defined in (2.10) are partially differentiable with
respect to the portfolio weights ui of the single loss variables. The partial derivatives
∂qα(u)
∂ui
are
given by
∂qα(u)
∂ui
= E
[ h(G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, S˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
]−1
E
[gi(G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜, u
)
h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, S˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
]
.
(3.7)
Proof. Fix z ∈]0, U [ and observe from (3.6c) that
G
(
G−1(s˜,u)(z), s˜, u
)
= z for all s˜, u
implies by (3.6a)
0 =
∂
∂ui
G
(
G−1(s˜,u)(z), s˜, u)
)
=
∂
∂ui
G−1(s˜,u)(z)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, s˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(s˜,u)
(z)
+
∂
∂wi
G
(
G−1(s˜,u)(z), s˜, w
)∣∣
w=u
=
∂
∂ui
G−1(s˜,u)(z)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, s˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(s˜,u)
(z)
+ gi
(
G−1(s˜,u)(z), s˜
)
8Some further technical conditions on uniform integrability of the random variables under consideration have
to be required, cf. Tasche (1999, Lemma 5.3) for a similar result.
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and as a further consequence
∂
∂ui
G−1(s˜,u)(z) = −
gi
(
G−1(s˜,u)(z), s˜
)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, s˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(s˜,u)
(z)
. (3.8a)
Additionally, we have
∂
∂z
G−1(s˜,u)(z) =
(
∂
∂v
G
(
v, s˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(s˜,u)
(z)
)−1
. (3.8b)
Assuming existence9 of ∂qα(u)
∂ui
, it can implicitly be determined as follows:
α = P[L(u) ≤ qα(u)]
= E
[
P[S1 ≥ G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)) | S˜]
]
= E
∫ ∞
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
h(y | S˜) dy

implies
0 = −E
[
∂
∂ui
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)) | S˜
)]
. (3.9)
By (3.8a) and (3.8b) we obtain
∂
∂ui
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)) =
∂
∂ui
G−1
(S˜,u)
(z)
∣∣
z=qα(u)
+
∂
∂z
G−1
(S˜,u)
(z)
∣∣
z=qα(u)
∂qα(u)
∂ui
=
(
∂
∂v
G
(
v, S˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
)−1(
∂qα(u)
∂ui
− gi
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜
))
.
(3.10)
Replacing ∂
∂ui
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)) in (3.9) by the right-hand side of (3.10) and solving for
∂qα(u)
∂ui
yields
the assertion. ✷
Remark 3.5 Equation (3.7) may equivalently be written as
∂qα(L(u))
∂ui
= E[gi(S) |L(u) = qα(L(u))]. (3.11)
This follows from Proposition 2.3 and Corollary 2.4. For by Corollary 2.4, we have for any
z ∈]0, U [
E
[
gi(S)1{L(u)≤z}
]
= −
∫ z
0
E[gi(S) |L(u) = t] E
 h(G(·, S˜)−1(t) | S˜)
∂
∂v
G(v, S˜)
∣∣
v=G(·,S˜)−1(t)
 dt. (3.12a)
9Under appropriate smoothness and moment conditions, existence can be proven by means of the implicit
function theorem.
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On the other hand, Proposition 2.3 implies with F (x) = x that
E
[
gi(S)1{L(u)≤z}
]
= −
∫ z
0
E
gi(G(·, S˜)−1(t), S˜)h(G(·, S˜)−1(t) | S˜)
∂
∂v
G(v, S˜)
∣∣
v=G(·,S˜)−1(t)
 dt. (3.12b)
Equating the right-hand sides of (3.12a) and (3.12b) respectively implies by taking the derivative
with respect to z and then letting z = qα(L(u)) that E[gi(S) |L(u) = qα(L(u))] equals the right-
hand side of (3.7). ✷
A result analogous to Theorem 3.4 for VaR holds for ES as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 3.6 Under Assumption 2.2, the Expected Shortfall risk measure E[L(u) |L(u) ≥
qα(u)] (with qα(u) = qα(L(u))) of the generalized loss variable as defined in (2.10) is partially
differentiable with respect to the weights ui. The partial derivatives can be computed as
∂
∂ui
E[L(u) |L(u) ≥ qα(u)] = E[gi(S) |L(u) ≥ qα(u)], i = 1, . . . , n. (3.13)
Proof. A straight-forward calculation as in the proof of Proposition 2.3 (see (2.13b)) yields
(1− α) ∂
∂ui
E[L(u) |L(u) ≥ qα(u)]
=
∂
∂ui
 n∑
j=1
uj E
[∫ G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
−∞
gj(y, S˜)h(y | S˜) dy
]
=
n∑
j=1
uj E
[
∂
∂ui
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)) gj
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜
)
h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)]
+E
[
gi(S)1{L(u)≥qα(u)}
]
. (3.14)
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Making use of identity (3.10) and of the definition of G−1
(S˜,u)
(see (3.6a) and (3.6b)) we obtain
n∑
j=1
uj E
[
∂
∂ui
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)) gj
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜
)
h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)]
=
∂qα(u)
∂ui
E

(∑n
j=1 uj gj
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜
))
h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, S˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))

−E

(∑n
j=1 uj gj
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜
))
gi
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜
)
h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, S˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))

= qα(u)
{
∂qα(u)
∂ui
E
 h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, S˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))

−E
gi
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u)), S˜
)
h
(
G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
∣∣ S˜)
∂
∂v
G
(
v, S˜, u
)∣∣
v=G−1
(S˜,u)
(qα(u))
}
= 0,
by Theorem 3.4. By means of (3.14) this implies the assertion. ✷
Remark 3.7 At first sight, formulae (3.11) and (3.13) look very much like corresponding for-
mulae for the derivatives of VaR and ES in Gourie´roux et al. (2000), Lemus (1999), and Tasche
(1999). Note, however, that those formulae were not derived in an asymptotic multi-factor set-
ting like the ones here. On the other hand, the validity of the results by Gourie´roux et al. (2000),
Lemus (1999), and Tasche (1999) is not restricted to the case of bounded loss variables of the
assets. Therefore, the results from this paper and the earlier results complement each other.
4 Defining a diversification measure
During the last few years, with regard to applications, three properties of risk measures ρ turned
out to be potentially most important:
• Positive homogeneity. See Assumption 3.2 for the formal definition and some com-
ments.
• Sub-additivity. Artzner et al. (1999, Axiom S) described sub-additivity with “a merger
does not create extra risk”. VaR as a risk measure is mainly criticized for lacking this
property. Kalkbrener et al. (2004) pointed out that, in the context of bank-internal credit
risk management, the following characterization of sub-additivity is more apposite. Sub-
additivity of a positively homogeneous risk measures is equivalent to the property that risk
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contributions are not larger than the corresponding stand-alone risks. Speaking in terms
of Sub-section 3.1,
ρ(V +W ) ≤ ρ(V ) + ρ(W ) for all V,W ⇔ ρ(V |W ) ≤ ρ(V ) for all V,W, (4.1)
if ρ is positively homogeneous (Tasche, 2002, Proposition 2.5).
• Comonotonic additivity. In actuarial science, the concept of comonotonicity is well-
known as it supports easy and reasonably conservative representations of dependence struc-
tures (see, e.g., Dhaene et al., 2006). Random variables V and W are called comonotonic
if they can be represented as non-decreasing functions of a third random variable Z, i.e.
V = hV (Z) and W = hW (Z) (4.2a)
for some non-decreasing functions hV , hW . As comonotonicity is implied if V and W are
correlated with correlation coefficient 1, it generalizes the concept of linear dependence. A
risk measure ρ is called comonotonic additive if for any comonotonic random variables V
and W
ρ(V +W ) = ρ(V ) + ρ(W ). (4.2b)
Thus comonotonic additivity can be interpreted as a specification of the worst case sce-
narios for the sub-additivity (4.1): nothing worse can occur than comonotonic random
variables – which seems quite natural.
Note that VaR is positively homogeneous and comonotonic additive but not sub-additive and
that ES is positively homogeneous, comonotonic additive and sub-additive (see, e.g. Tasche,
2002). As a consequence, finding worst case scenarios for given marginal distributions of V,W
in (4.1) is easy in case of ES (take the comonotonic scenario) and non-trivial in case of VaR (see
Embrechts et al., 2003; Luciano and Marena, 2003).
As for positively homogeneous, comonotonic additive and sub-additive risk measures nothing
worse than the comonotonic case can happen, it seems natural to measure diversification by
comparison with the comonotonic scenario10. This suggests the following definition.
Definition 4.1 Let X1, . . . ,Xn be real-valued random variables and let Y =
∑n
i=1Xi. If ρ is a
risk measure such that ρ(Y ), ρ(X1), . . . , ρ(Xn) are defined, then
DFρ(Y ) =
ρ(Y )∑n
i=1 ρ(Xi)
denotes the diversification factor of portfolio Y with respect to the risk measure ρ.
The fraction
DFρ(Xi |Y ) = ρ(Xi |Y )
ρ(Xi)
10Martin and Tasche (2005) suggest another approach to measuring diversification as they calculate the pro-
portions of systematic and idiosyncratic risk within the total risk of the portfolio.
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with ρ(Xi |Y ) being the risk contribution of Xi as in Definition 3.1 denotes the marginal diver-
sification factor of sub-portfolio Xi with respect to the risk measure ρ.
Note that without calling the concept “diversification factor”, Memmel and Wehn (2006) calcu-
late a diversification factor for the German supervisor’s market price risk portfolio. Garcia Cespedes et al.
(2006) use the diversification factors as defined here for a representation of portfolio risk as a
“diversification factor”-weighted sum of stand-alone risks.
If ρ is sub-additive and positively homogeneous, then by (4.1) both DFρ(Y ) and DFρ(Xi |Y )
will be bounded by 1. If ρ is additionally comonotonic additive, then the bound 1 can be reached
by portfolios with comonotonic risks. Thus, with a reasonable risk measure, DFρ(Y ) being close
to 1 will indicate that there is no significant diversification in the portfolio. Similarly, a value of
DFρ(Xi |Y ) close to 1 will indicate that there is almost no diversification effect with asset i. As
the dependence – measured as degree of comonotonicity – in a portfolio is influenced both by the
idiosyncratic and the systematic risk factors, the diversification factors according to Definition
4.1 capture name diversification as well as sectoral diversification.
Although VaR is not a sub-additive risk measure in general, some authors argue that, by prac-
tical experience, it can be considered an almost sub-additive risk measure (cf. Danielsson et al.,
2005). This observation, however, seems to be strongly dependent on the context. For instance,
Frey and McNeil (2002, Section 2.3) present an example of a credit portfolio where “measuring
risk with VaR can lead to nonsensical results”. In the following section we illustrate the use of
the diversification factors from Definition 4.1 by a numerical example. We consider VaR as the
underlying risk measure because this facilitates the calculations.
5 Numerical example
In this section, we illustrate the application of the formulae for the loss distribution function
(Proposition 2.5) and the risk contributions to VaR (Theorem 3.4) with a simple example. We
consider a special case of model (2.10) with two normally distributed systematic factors and
normally distributed idiosyncratic risk drivers as in Example 2.1.
As for (2.9), we consider the case n = 2 which may be interpreted as having a portfolio with a
large number of credit instruments in two different sectors. Both of these sectors are exposed
to the first systematic factor, but only the first sector is also exposed to the second factor. By
varying the extent of this exposure to the second systematic factor we will obtain a picture
of the effect of sectoral diversification by dependence on more than one systematic factors.
Additionally, we will fix the exposure to the second systematic factor but vary the weights of
the sectors within the portfolio in order to get an impression of the influence of the sectoral
structure on the diversification factors defined in Section 4.
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Example 5.1 Consider the loss variable Lˆ(u) from Example 2.1 in the case n = 2 with standard
normally distributed systematic factors S1 and S2 and independent (also of (S1, S2)) standard
normally distributed idiosyncratic risk drivers ξ1, ξ2. We consider the case of relative (to the
total exposure) loss, i.e. the case u1 + u2 = 1. Hence, Lˆ(u) reads here
Lˆ(u) = uΦ
(
t1 −√̺1,1 S1 −√̺1,2 S2
ω1
)
+ (1− u)Φ
(
Φ−1(p)−√̺2,1 S1 −√̺2,2 S2
ω2
)
. (5.1)
With respect to the correlations with the systematic factors, we fix some ̺ ∈ (0, 1) and let
̺1,1 =
√
̺w
1 + 2w (1− w) τ , ̺1,2 =
√
̺ (1− w)
1 + 2w (1− w) τ , (5.2a)
̺2,1 =
√
̺, ̺2,2 = 0, (5.2b)
where w ∈ [0, 1] is a weight parameter controlling the exposure of the first sector to the second
factor and τ denotes the correlation of S1 and S2, i.e. τ = corr[S1, S2]. Choosing the ̺i,j as in
(5.2a) and (5.2b) implies by (2.6)
ω1 =
√
1− ̺ = ω2. (5.2c)
The square-root representation in (5.2a) and (5.2b) was chosen in order to make the correlations
comparable in size with those from BCBS (2006, §272). By choosing ̺1,1 and ̺1,2 as in (5.2a), we
ensure that in (5.1) both factor combinations ̺i,1 S1 + ̺i,2 S2, i = 1, 2, are identically normally
distributed with variance ̺. As a consequence, the weights on idiosyncratic risk are the same
across the two sectors. Thus, in the example all observed differences in VaR or in the risk
contributions are due to the sector structure only. A weight w = 1 means that we are in a single
factor model, whereas w = 0 implies that the factors that drive the risk of the both sectors have
correlation τ and are, in particular, independent for τ = 0.
For the first calculations we choose
t1 = Φ
−1(0.1) = t2, ̺ = 0.1, u = 0.1. (5.3)
This choice is mainly driven by the desire to come up with illustrative results. The value 10% for
̺ is somewhere in the center of the span provided by BCBS (2006). The choice for the threshold
values t1 and t2 may be interpreted as having a large credit portfolio with two sectors, both
with an average probability of default of 10%.
In order to assess the impact on sectoral diversification by several systematic factors at portfolio
level, first we calculate11 VaR-figures at different confidence levels both for the single factor model
as in (5.1) with w = 1 as well as for the two-factor model with w = 0. Table 1 for independent
systematic factors and Table 2 for positively correlated systematic factors show that the impact
11The calculations for the following examples require numerical root-finding and integration. Files with the
R-code (cf. R Development Core Team, 2003) used by the author can be provided upon request.
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Table 1: VaRs at different confidence levels α for the asymptotic single (w = 1)
and two-factor (w = 0) models as in Example 5.1. Parameter values as in
(5.3). Independent systematic factors (τ = 0).
α 75% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 99.9% 99.95%
VaR (single factor) 13.0% 17.8% 21.1% 24.3% 28.3% 37.4% 40.0%
VaR (two factors) 12.7% 17.0% 20.0% 22.9% 26.5% 34.7% 37.0%
Ratio of the above 97.9% 95.8% 94.9% 94.3% 93.7% 92.8% 92.6%
even in the case of an independent second factor and for high levels of VaR remains limited.
The results from Table 2, compared to those of Table 1, reflect the non-surprising fact that,
with positively correlated systematic factors, the potential for diversification is less than in the
case of independent systematic factors.
Table 2: VaRs at different levels α for the asymptotic single (w = 1) and
two-factor (w = 0) models as in Example 5.1. Parameter values as in (5.3).
Systematic factors with 50% correlation (τ = 0.5).
α 75% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 99.9% 99.95%
VaR (single factor) 13.0% 17.8% 21.1% 24.3% 28.3% 37.4% 40.0%
VaR (two factors) 12.9% 17.4% 20.6% 23.6% 27.4% 36.1% 38.5%
Ratio of the above 99.2% 98.1% 97.6% 97.3% 96.9% 96.4% 96.3%
The impact of sectoral diversification turns out to be much higher if we consider UL contributions
with respect to VaR instead of total VaR. “UL” means “unexpected loss” and is defined by
choosing
ρ(V ) = VaRα(V )− E[V ] = qα(V )− E[V ] = UL(V ) (5.4)
in Definition 3.1. In Figure 1 we plot the relative contribution to UL with respect to 99.9%-VaR
of the first sector in the model in Example 5.1 (i.e. the ratio of the contribution of the first sector
to UL in the sense of Definition 3.1 and portfolio-wide UL) against the extent of the sector’s
exposure to the first factor (low values of w correspond to low exposure, values of w close to
1 correspond to high exposure). For calculating the contributions, we applied (3.7). In the
case of independent systematic factors, it turns out that the size of the risk contribution of the
first sector can be reduced to almost 0 when it is exposed to the second systematic factor only.
The rate of the reduction becomes the smaller the stronger the exposure to the first systematic
factor but remains significant. These effects are significantly weaker, if there is a positive, but
less than 100% correlation of the systematic factors. There is no reduction at all of the risk
contribution, if the correlation of the systematic factors is 100% – this corresponds to the case
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of the asymptotic single risk factor model that underlies the Basel II risk capital charges.
Figure 1: Relative contribution to UL with respect to 99.9%-Var of the first sector in
the model in Example 5.1 as function of the extent of the sector’s exposure (measured
by w ∈ [0, 1]) to the first factor. Parameter values as in (5.3). Factor correlations
50%, 0%, and 100% respectively.
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In order to illustrate the functioning of the diversification factors defined in Section 4 we fix the
exposure of the first sector to the second systematic factor by setting w = 0.5. We then make the
weight u (see (5.1)) of the first sector in the portfolio move from 0% to 100%. As in the case of
Figure 1, we calculate with two different values for the correlation of the two systematic factors.
The parameter settings for Figure 2 are given in Equations (5.5a) and (5.5b) respectively.
τ = 0, t1 = Φ
−1(0.2), t2 = Φ
−1(0.1), ̺ = 0.1 (5.5a)
τ = 0.5, t1 = Φ
−1(0.2), t2 = Φ
−1(0.1), ̺ = 0.1. (5.5b)
Figure 2 illustrates the connection between the two types of diversification factors from Definition
4.1. In both panels, the solid line shows the portfolio-wide diversification factor of the loss
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variable from (5.1). The dashed lines in the panels of Figure 2 reflect the corresponding marginal
diversification factor of the first sector, whereas the dotted lines give the marginal diversification
factor of the second sector. The first panel of Figure 2 represents the case of independent
systematic factors, whereas the second panel of Figure 2 shows the case of positively correlated
systematic factors. From the definition of the risk contribution by means of a derivative (see
Definition 3.1), in both cases it follows that the three lines intersect at just the weight of the
first sector that yields the most diversified portfolio in the sense of being the portfolio with the
minimum diversification factor to be feasible by changing the sector weights.
Figure 2: Diversification factors with respect to UL in sense of Definition 4.1 for loss
variable Lˆ(u) and sectors from Example 5.1, with w = 0.5. Represented as functions
of weight u ∈ [0, 1] of first sector. First panel for case of independent systematic
factors, second panel for case of correlated systematic factors. Parameter setting
specified by (5.5a) and (5.5b) respectively.
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According to Figure 2, those portfolios where portfolio-wide and marginal diversification factors
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are close together could be called well-diversified. A wide range of the diversification factors of
a portfolio would then indicate that the portfolio is not very well diversified. However, Figure
2 demonstrates that the possible range of the diversification factors depends on the potential
for diversification. The smaller maximum possible range of the marginal diversification in the
correlated case correctly indicates that in the extreme case of exposure to only one systematic
factor the portfolio is closer to the optimum than it is in the independent case. But this is
only due to the fact that in the case of positively correlated systematic factors, the potential
for diversification is less than in the case of independent systematic factors, as follows from the
higher value of the minimum portfolio-wide diversification factor.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have derived closed-form formulae for risk contributions to VaR and ES in
the context of asymptotic multi-factor models, thus generalizing the capital requirements as
provided by the Basel II Accord in the context of the ASRF (Asymptotic Single Risk Factor)
model. The effort needed for the numerical calculations is higher than in the ASRF case but,
as a numerical example shows, remains feasible at least in the case of two-factor models. The
example also indicates that the effect of sectoral diversification by several systematic factors on
portfolio-wide economic capital is moderate but can be significant for risk contributions of single
assets, sectors or sub-portfolios.
The risk contributions we have analyzed in the first sections of the paper can be used for
calculating diversification factors for sub-portfolios, sectors or assets in a portfolio. If these
factors, considered for all the assets, sectors of sub-portfolios in the portfolio, take a wide range,
then there is a high potential for diversification in the portfolio. If, in contrast, the range of the
factors is narrow, there is not much potential left for diversification by changing the weights of
the assets, sectors or sub-portfolios in the portfolio. In this case, more diversification can only
be reached by adding new assets or by removing assets from the portfolio.
This observation suggests the use of the newly developed diversification factors for reflecting
sectoral diversification by several systematic factors: assets, sectors or sub-portfolios found well-
diversified by a marginal diversification factor close to the portfolio-wide diversification factor
could receive a reduction of capital requirements. The sizes of such reductions could be estimated
by means of an asymptotic multi-factor model. Of course, the concrete choice of the model and
its underlying parameters might have a strong impact on the estimates. Further research in this
direction seems necessary.
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